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Abstract—An agent architecture supports the two forms of
deliberation used by human agents. The work is founded on the
two forms of rationality described by the two Nobel Laureates
Friedrich Hayek and Vernon Smith. Cartesian, constructivist
rationalism leads to game theory, decision theory and logical
models. Ecological rationalism leads to deliberative actions
that are derived from agents’ prior interactions and are not
designed; i.e., they are strictly emergent. This paper aims to
address the scant attention paid by the multiagent systems
community to the predominant form of deliberation used by
mankind.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper is concerned with the issue generally known
as bounded rationality that dates back to David Hume [1]
and more recently to the early work of Herbert Simon.
Bounded rationality refers to systems that are not founded
on Cartesian rationalism; it has been widely addressed in
economics [2], and is discussed in all good books on
artificial intelligence, e.g. [3].
For over fifty years artificial intelligence research has
spawned countless theories and systems that are not founded
on Cartesian rationalism; one classic contribution being Rod-
ney Brooks’ work reported in his ‘Computers and Thought’
award-winning paper [4]. Despite these advances, work in
multiagent systems has been heavily influenced by game
theory, decision theory and logic [5]; this is in contrast to
an original motivation for investigating ‘distributed artificial
intelligence’ in the mid 1970s where intelligence emerged
from the interactions between systems.
This paper describes a form of agency that enables rational
agents to move beyond Cartesian rationalism. The work is
founded on the two forms of rationality described by the
two Nobel Laureates Friedrich Hayek [6] and Vernon Smith
[7] as being within ‘two worlds’.
The work of Hayek and Smith is concerned with human
agents and with economic agents, and not directly with com-
puterised, intelligent agents where the predominant logical
distinction is between deliberative and reactive logic. Hayek
and Smith’s two rationalities lead to two distinct forms of
deliberation, and has little directly to do with autonomic
reactivity that typically overrides other processes in both the
human neuropsychological system and in intelligent agents;
for example, when we touch something that is very hot.
Hayek and Smith identify; constructivist rationality that
underpins rational predictive models of decision making;
and, ecological rationality founded on the concept of “spon-
taneous order” that refers to social institutions and practices
that emerge from the history of an agent’s interactions and
are not pre-designed.
For intelligent agency we interpret Hayek and Smith’s two
rationalities as:
• Constructivist. An agent’s actions are determined by
a theory that may be independent of the particular
environment in which the agent is situated.
• Ecological. An agent’s actions are the product of prior
agents’ actions only — this includes observations that
an agent has made of its environment.
As the name suggests, ecological rationality is concerned
with a richer form of bounded rationality than simplifying
the calculation of a theoretically ‘optimal’ action by: rules
for simplifying search, rules for terminating search or heuris-
tic decision rules to select actions from an incomplete set of
options [8]. Ecological rationality is taken in the context of
the Hayekian view [6] in which agents evolve themselves
together with the norms1 of the systems they inhabit2
whilst their environment changes. Norms, that may well be
incompatible with an agent’s goals, enable agents to interact
in an orderly way, and to achieve goals through collective
deliberation that they could not achieve individually. This
evolutionary collective deliberation may override personal
instinctual behaviours such as indiscriminate greed driven
by a desire to survive; it enables agents to become, and
to remain, civilised. In this context, ecological rationality is
deliberation that uses past experience and contextual triggers
1Hayek uses the term ‘order’ that refers to: traditions, customs, norms,
rules and guidelines. An agent may belong to a number of normative
systems (or, electronic institutions [9]) whose norms may be shared with,
or in conflict with, those of other systems. The ‘extended order’ includes
the whole show. If a multiagent system interacts with human society then
its norms will respect the rules and laws that apply to society as a whole.
2The evolution of individual agents and component systems are not
considered in isolation — the whole ensemble evolves in response to itself
and to the environment — they are complex systems. For example, in
Hayek’s extensive writing there is little mention of ethics as it too evolves.
to build action sequences from experiential memory.
Past experience is a precursor to ecological rationality.
For example, as we have described them previously, trust
and honour [10] and reputation [11], are purely ecological
concepts. An agent’s experiential memory contains a record
of: what occurred when each prior individual action was
made, and a record of what occurred when each goal-
directed sequence of actions was completed. The extent of
an agent’s experiential memory will be limited by the extent
to which it can observe actions performed by other agents
and can gauge their effect.
Building action sequences from experiential memory in-
volves more than just retrieval. An agent has: to learn to
imitate the actions that it believes that others do, to form
expectations of the effect of actions, to select actions from a
set of candidates, to adapt actions to suit the current norms
and state of the environment, and when things don’t work
out to learn to experiment with untested actions.
The co-evolution of agents and systems is central to
Hayek’s view of how things should be [6]. The main driver
for this co-evolutionary process is competition. This does
not mean that co-operation is bad. Creating or joining
co-operative sub-systems are the means by which agents
achieve goals beyond their individual capacity, and then
these co-operative sub-systems attain their goals in the com-
petitive world in which they are situated. Such competition
requires that the agents that comprise them, and the norms
that bind them, must co-evolve for such a co-operative sub-
system to survive. This all sounds rather Darwinian, but
Hayek is careful to distinguish between genetic evolution
and cultural evolution [op. cit. page 23].
Hayek places constructivist theories in their context —
they are produced through a cultural evolutionary process
by human agents and by the norms by which they abide [6].
He exposes the fallacy in using theories to control agents and
systems by: calling “on human reason to seize the reigns and
control future development” [op. cit. page 22].
Why would an agent be motivated to deliberate in a
non-constructivist way? First, it may not be aware of a
constructivist theory that addresses its goals3. Second, it
may have difficulty articulating its needs and its context
completely and accurately in the theory. Third, the data
required by the theory to determine its actions may not be
readily available. Fourth, it may not have sufficient time for
all this to happen. Fifth, it may favour ecological deliberation
simply because it leads to a superior outcome. For example,
when selecting a bottle of wine, some human agents refer to
books of ratings and prices and make a constructivist choice,
3For example, the agent may desire to act so as to strengthen, or weaken,
a relationship with a particular agent, perhaps to discharge or generate some
social obligation, or it may desire to act so that it is seen to be behaving a
particular way, perhaps by apparently behaving altruistically — there may
not be a theory that satisfactorily balances these desires with more mundane
desires concerning the effect of the actions that it can take.



















whereas others rely on their merchant to make a choice for
them — this choice is purely ecological, its ‘rationality’ is
in the trust that has been built through repeated interaction.
This paper is organised as follows. Various preliminaries
are described in Section II. Section III introduces the es-
sential features of the agent architecture including the world
model, and a ‘social model’ that is essential to ecological
deliberation. Section IV describes expectations of the effect
of actions in the experiential memory— these expectations
include measures of trust. Section V describes the ecological
deliberative process, and Section VI concludes.
II. PRELIMINARIES
This work is based on the intelligent agent framework
illustrated in Figure 1. An agent’s in-coming messages (the
actions of other agents) and observations of the effect of
its own actions are tagged with the identity of the sending
agent and the time received, and are stored in a repository.
A world model contains beliefs of the state of the other
agents and the environment, and a social model contains
beliefs of the state of the agent’s relationships with the other
agents. The agent’s experiential memory contains complete
historic information concerning prior actions and sequences
of actions — this is detailed in Section III.
Some messages trigger the agent’s reactive logic that
overrides other activities and may cause an action to be
performed or may trigger further deliberative processes.
Summarising techniques are used to distil the large number
of incoming messages into summary expectations of the
effect of actions including: trust, honour and reliability.
These expectations may be used by the agent’s constructivist
deliberation, and are vital to its ecological deliberation. The
agent aims to satisfy its needs using one of two forms of
deliberation: constructivist (described in [12]) that is based
on theories that call on plans, and ecological that uses past
experience and contextual triggers to retrieve or build action
sequences from experiential memory.
This paper draws from our work on information-based
agency [13] that is well-suited to this purpose. It supports
rich models of inter-agent relationships [14] that are a
quintessential feature of emergent behaviour between agents,
it supports rich models of trust, honour and reliability [10]
that provide the rationale for ecologically rational behaviour,
it includes a generate and test approach to planning [12],
additionally it uses tools from information theory to manage
uncertainty in a nice way. The main contribution of this
paper is to describe a single agent that exhibits ecological
deliberation, we show how it evolves as its experience grows.
The evolution of norms, institutions and systems will be the
subject of future work.
We assume that a multiagent system
{α, β1, . . . , βo, ξ, θ1, . . . , θt}, contains an agent α that
interacts with negotiating agents, βi, and information
providing agents, θj . We assume that each dialogical
interaction takes place within a particular institution that is
represented by an institutional agent, ξ, [9]. Institutions, or
normative systems, play a central role in this work. We will
describe an ontology that will permit us both to structure the
dialogues and to structure the processing of the information
gathered by agents. Our agent α has two languages: C is an
illocutionary-based language for communication, and L is a
probabilistic first-order language for internal representation
including the representation of its world model Mt. C is
described in [14].
In order to structure agent dialogues we need an ontology
that includes a (minimum) repertoire of elements: a set of
concepts (e.g. quantity, quality, material) organised in a is-
a hierarchy (e.g. platypus is a mammal, australian-dollar
is a currency), and a set of relations over these concepts
(e.g. price(beer,Australian-dollar)).4 We model ontologies
following an algebraic approach [15].
An ontology is a tuple O = (C,R,≤, σ) where:
1) C is a finite set of concept symbols (including basic
data types);
2) R is a finite set of relation symbols;
3) ≤ is a reflexive, transitive and anti-symmetric relation
on C (a partial order);
4) σ : R→ C+ is the function assigning to each relation
symbol its arity.
where ≤ is a traditional is-a hierarchy, and R contains
relations between the concepts in the hierarchy.
The concepts within an ontology are closer, semantically
speaking, depending on how far away are they in the
structure defined by the ≤ relation. Semantic distance plays
a fundamental role in this work. A measure [16] bases the
semantic similarity between two concepts on the path length
induced by ≤ (more distance in the ≤ graph means less
semantic similarity), and the depth of the subsumer concept
4Usually, a set of axioms defined over the concepts and relations is also
required. We will omit this here.
(common ancestor) in the shortest path between the two
concepts (the deeper in the hierarchy, the closer the meaning
of the concepts). Semantic similarity is then defined as:
Sim(c, c′) = e−κ1l · e
κ2h − e−κ2h
eκ2h + e−κ2h
where l is the length (i.e. number of hops) of the shortest
path between the concepts, h is the depth of the deepest
concept subsuming both concepts, and κ1 and κ2 are pa-
rameters scaling the contribution of shortest path length and
depth respectively.
Given a formula ϕ ∈ C in the communication language we
define the vocabulary or ontological context of the formula,
O(ϕ), as the set of concepts in the ontology used in it.
Thus, we extend the previous definition of similarity to sets






These definitions of semantic similarity are based only on
the structure of the ontology, and are a first approximation
to ‘semantic distance’ in a rich sense.
III. AGENT ARCHITECTURE
α acts by delivering utterances, and observes by receiving
them. α acts to satisfy a need that may be exogenous
such as a need to trade profitably, triggered by another
agent’s actions, or endogenous such as α deciding that it
owns more wine than it requires. Needs either trigger α’s
constructivist, goal/plan deliberative reasoning described in
[12], or ecological deliberation described in Section V.
Agent α receives all messages expressed in C, they
are time-stamped and sourced-stamped, qualified with a
subjective belief function Rt(α, β, µ) that normally decays
with time (see below), and are stored in a repository Yt
that contains information concerning every5 action that α
observes — presumably this will include those actions that
α takes.
α’s experiential memory contains a history of what hap-
pened when any goal-directed sequence of actions was
triggered or when any individual action was observed. First
an individual action experience, a, consists of:
• the action, aact, i.e. the utterance, the sending and
receiving agents, and the time at which the action was
taken,
• the trigger, or precondition, that signalled when the
action was to be performed, atrig,
• any observed effect(s), aeffect6, i.e. any identifiable
responses that are an effect of aact — see Section IV.
Then a sequence experience, s, consists of:
5Practicality is not a concern here.
6These may be difficult to identify precisely, but recording effects is
considerably more economical than recording posterior world states.
• the goal of the sequence, sgoal, that may have been to
satisfy a need,
• a sequence of action experiences, s~a = (ai)ni=1, where
each action experience ai is described as above,
• beliefs of the prevailing environment, senv, that in-
cludes: the institutional norms that apply at the
time, snorm, the agents involved in the interaction,
sagents, and the state of the social model (see Sec-
tion III-B) between the agents, ssocial, i.e. senv =
{snorm, sagents, ssocial},
• a rating7 of the outcome of the action sequence, srate,
that enables an ecologically rational agent to develop
its repertoire of actions.
α uses the contents of its experiential memory to: reuse
successful action sequences, build new sequences from in-
dividual actions, and improve prior sequences by using its
knowledge of individual action experiences.
The integrity of beliefs derived from observations de-
creases in time. α may have background knowledge con-
cerning the expected integrity of a belief as t → ∞.
Such background knowledge is represented as a decay limit
distribution. If the background knowledge is incomplete then
one possibility is for α to assume that the decay limit
distribution has maximum entropy whilst being consistent
with the data. Given an uncertain belief represented as the
distribution, P(Xi), and a decay limit distribution D(Xi),
P(Xi) decays by:
Pt+1(Xi) = ∆i(D(Xi),Pt(Xi)) (2)
where ∆i is the decay function for the Xi satisfying the
property that limt→∞ Pt(Xi) = D(Xi). For example, ∆i
could be linear: Pt+1(Xi) = (1−νi)×D(Xi)+νi×Pt(Xi),
where νi < 1 is the decay rate for the i’th distribution. Either
the decay function or the decay limit distribution could also
be a function of time: ∆ti and Dt(Xi).
A. World Model
In the absence of in-coming messages the integrity of Mt
decays by Equation 2. The following procedure updatesMt
for all utterances expressed in C. Suppose that α receives
a message µ from agent β at time t. Suppose that this
message states that something is so with probability z, and
suppose that α attaches an epistemic belief Rt(α, β, µ) to
µ — this probability reflects α’s level of personal caution.
7This rating is not simply in terms of the extent to which the sequence
outcome met the original need, but in a sense that includes the possibility
that the other agents involved may have adapted their actions to take
account of changes in circumstance that occur during the sequence itself,
or even that they went “over the odds” and gave more than was expected
of them in some sense. These ratings are on a fuzzy scale from −5 to +5
where 0 means “is perfectly acceptable”, −5 means “ghastly, completely
unacceptable” and +5 means “better than I could have dreamed of”.
Ratings are not a ‘utility function’ in any sense — they are a subjective
assessment of outcomes that is totally dependent on the prevailing state of
the environment.
Each of α’s active plans, s, contains constructors for a
set of distributions {Xi} ∈ Mt together with associated
update functions, Js(·), such that JXis (µ) is a set of linear
constraints on the posterior distribution for Xi. Examples of
these update functions are given in Section IV-A. Denote
the prior distribution Pt(Xi) by ~p, and let ~p(µ) be the
distribution with minimum relative entropy8 with respect to





that satisfies the constraints
JXis (µ). Then let ~q(µ) be the distribution:




~q(µ) ~q(µ) is more interesting than ~p
~p otherwise
(4)
A general measure of whether ~q(µ) is ‘more interesting than’




is the Kullback-Leibler distance between two
probability distributions ~x and ~y.
Finally merging Equations 4 and 2 we obtain the method
for updating a distribution Xi on receipt of a message µ:
Pt+1(Xi) = ∆i(D(Xi),Pt(Xi(µ))) (5)
This procedure deals with integrity decay, and with two
probabilities: first, any probability z in the message µ, and
second the belief Rt(α, β, µ) that α attached to µ.
Rt(α, β, µ) is estimated by measuring the ‘difference’
between µ and its subsequent verification. Suppose that
µ is received from agent β at time u and is verified by
ξ as µ′ at some later time t. Denote the prior Pu(Xi)
by ~p. Let ~p(µ) be the posterior minimum relative entropy
distribution subject to the constraints JXis (µ), and let ~p(µ′)
be that distribution subject to JXis (µ
′). We now estimate
what Ru(α, β, µ) should have been in the light of knowing
now, at time t, that µ should have been µ′.
The idea of Equation 3, is that Rt(α, β, µ) should be such
that, on average across Mt, ~q(µ) will predict ~p(µ′) — no
matter whether or not µ was used to update the distribution
for Xi, as determined by the condition in Equation 4 at
time u. The observed reliability for µ and distribution Xi,
RtXi(α, β, µ)|µ
′, on the basis of the verification of µ with
µ′, is the value of k that minimises the Kullback-Leibler
distance:
RtXi(α, β, µ)|µ
′ = arg min
k
K(k · ~p(µ) + (1− k) · ~p ‖ ~p(µ′))
B. Social Model
The social model contains beliefs of the state of α’s relation-
ships with other agents — it consists of two components.
First, an intimacy model that for each agent β consists of
8Entropy-based inference is a form of Bayesian inference that is con-
venient when the data is sparse [17] and encapsulates common-sense
reasoning [18].
α’s model of β’s private information, and, α’s model of the
private information that β has about α. Second, a balance
model of the extent of reciprocity between pairs of agents.
Intimacy and balance were first reported in [14] to support
argumentative negotiation where they were based on five
illocutionary categories. Our requirements here are more
general, and the models are quite different but we retain the
same names. The spirit of them remains the same: intimacy
— degree of closeness, and balance — degree of fairness.
Intimacy is defined in terms of information gain, and balance
in terms of ratings.
Private information is categorised first by the type of
statement, using a set of illocutionary particles F , and
second by the contents of the statement, using the ontology
O. A categorising function κ : U → P(F), where U is
the set of utterances, allocates utterances to one or more
category in the framework. The power set, P(F), is required
as some utterances belong to multiple categories.
Itα/β is α’s model of β’s private information; it is rep-
resented as real numeric values over F × O. Suppose α
receives utterance u from β and that category f ∈ κ(u) then:
Itα/β(f,c) = I
t−1
α/β(f,c) + λ× I(u)× Sim(u, c) for any c ∈ O,
where λ is the learning rate, Itα/β(f,c) is the intimacy value in
the (f, c) position in F×O, I(u) is the Shannon information
gain inMt due to receiving u using Equation 5, and Sim is
as in Equation 1. Additionally, the intimacy model decays
in time in any case by Itα/β = δ × I
t−1
α/β where δ < 1 and
very close to 1 is the decay rate.
Itα\β is α’s model of the private information that β has
about α. Assuming that confidential information is treated in
confidence9 α will know what β knows about α. This means
that the same method can be used to model Itα\β as I
t
α/β
with the exception of estimating I(u) as it is most unlikely
that α will know the precise state of β’s world model — for
this we resort to the assumption that β’s world model mirrors
α’s and ‘estimate’ the information gain. Then the intimacy




α\β). In [14] balance was defined
as the element by element numeric difference of Itα/β and
Itα\β . That definition is not suitable here.
Rtα/β is a model of α’s aggregated rating of β’s actions in
assisting α to achieve her goals and satisfy her needs. α will
have a variety of goals including the acquisition of goods,
information, offering and receiving advice, gossip, and so
on. These goals are categorised using a set of illocutionary
particles G and the ontology O. Suppose α triggers an action
sequence s with goal g = (k, d) when the state of the
environment is e and on completion of the sequence rates
the outcome as ρ(α, s, e) then:
Rtα/β(k,c) = R
t−1
α/β(k,c) + λ× ρ(α, s, e)× Sim(d, c)
for any c ∈ O, where ρ(α, s, e) is the fuzzy rating of the
9See [12] for a discussion on measuring confidentiality i.e. ‘information
leakage’.
outcome of s as an integer in the range [−5,+5], λ is the
learning rate, Rtα/β(k,c) is the aggregated rating in the (k, c)
position in G×O, and Sim is as in Equation 1. Additionally,
the model decays10 in time in any case by Rtα/β = δ×R
t−1
α/β
where δ < 1 and very close to 1 is the decay rate.
α should have “a pretty good idea” of how β rates
α’s actions in assisting β to achieve her goals, and Rtα\β
models α’s estimates of β’s rating of α’s performance. Then





structure is a historical summary of how α believes it has
“done the right thing”, or otherwise, by other agents. It also
exposes social debts, obligations and opportunities.
IV. EXPECTATIONS
An ecologically rational agent’s rationality lies only in its
past experience. To behave rationally it will require some
expectation, based on that experience, of what other agents
will do. Experiential memory records each of the agent’s
individual experiences; it does not address expectation. We
now derive expectations from this historic data. Expectations
are considered for the two classes of experience in experi-
ential memory. First, expectations concerning the effect of
making a single action (i.e. utterance), second, expectations
of the effect of triggering an action sequence.
A. Expected effect of a single action
We consider expectations concerning the effect of making a
single action; that is, the expected aeffect given aact. To make
this problem tractable we consider only utterances for which
a particular form of response is expected. For example,
“what is the time?” or “send me a bottle of Protos11”. For
these utterances α utters u and expects to observe utterances,
v, from a particular set of agents, Ω, and of a form from the
set F . α’s expectations are that:
∀u ∈ U · Enacttα(u)→ ∀β ∈ Ω · ∃v ∈ U · ∃w ∈ F
(Observetβα (Enactβ(v)) ∧ In(v, w) ∧ Form(u, β, w))
(6)
where Form(u, β, w) means that w is a form of response
that α expects having uttered u, In(v, w) means that v is
an instantiation of w, and tβ > t. For example, u could
be “what is the price of Protos”, w could be “the price of
Protos is x”, and v could be “the price of Protos is e40”.
[19] describes a neat way of dealing with instantiation using
a refinement relation.
For each agent β ∈ Ω we abbreviate the expectation
of Equation 6 to Ptβ(v|u). In the absence of in-coming
messages the conditional probabilities, Ptβ(v|u), should tend
to ignorance as represented by the decay limit distribution
and Equation 2. We now show how Equation 5 may be used
10This form of decay means that in the limit all values in the model
decay to 0 meaning “is perfectly acceptable”. This may appear to be odd,
but the model is used only to gauge divergence from the norm; it is not
used to select a trading partner — that is a job for the trust model.
11A fine wine from the ‘Ribera del Duero’ region, Spain.
to revise Pt(v|u) as observations are made. Let the set of
possible utterances be Φ = {v1, v2, . . . , vm} with prior dis-
tribution ~p = Ptβ(v|u). Suppose that message w is received,
we estimate the posterior ~p(w) = (p(w)i)mi=1 = Pt+1(v|u).
First, given the expectation Ptβ(v|u), if α observes that
β utters vk then α may use this observation to estimate
p(vk)k as some value d at time t + 1. We estimate the
distribution ~p(vk) by applying the principle of minimum
relative entropy as in Equation 5 with prior ~p, and the
posterior ~p(vk) = (p(vk)j)
m
j=1 satisfying the single constraint:
J (v|u)(vk) = {p(vk)k = d}.
Second, α may use the above observation to revise
Ptβ(v′|u′) when u and u′ are semantically close in the sense
of Equation 1. For example, u could be “please send me
a chicken on Tuesday” and u′ could be “please send me
a duck on Thursday”. Following the notation above this is
achieved by: J (v
′|u′)(vk) = {p(vk)k = d × g(Sim(u, u′))}
provided that: d×g(Sim(u, u′)) > pk, where g is a function
that moderates the values of the Sim function, and pk is the
prior value. Equation 4 will ensure that this update process
only applies when d× g(Sim(u, u′)) is sufficiently large to
deliver positive information gain to Pt+1β (v′|u′).
The entropy Htβ(v|u) estimates α’s uncertainty in β’s
response given that α has uttered u. α may interact with
more than one agent. Suppose that agent γ is an ideal agent
who always responds impeccably then:






measures the relative entropy between this ideal distribu-
tion, Ptγ(v|u), and the distribution of β’s expected actions,
Ptβ(v|u), where the “1” is an arbitrarily chosen constant
being the maximum value that this measure may have. This
estimate is with respect to a single u. It makes sense to
aggregate these values over a class of utterances, say over
those u that are in the ontological context o, that is u ≤ o:
Tα(β, γ, o) = 1−
∑
u:u≤o Ptα(u) [1−Mα(β, γ, u)]∑
u:u≤o Ptβ(u)
where Ptα(u) is a probability distribution over the space of
utterances that α’s next utterance to β is u.
B. Expected rating of an action sequence
We consider expectations concerning the effect of triggering
an action sequence. Suppose that α triggers an action
sequence, s with goal g where the state of the environment
is e then we are interested in the rating of the outcome r.
Given the rich meaning of the environment, as described in
Section III, it is reasonable to consider:
P(Observet
′
(r) | Enactt(s), e) (7)
If Ω ∈ e is the set of agents in e, then the aggregated rating12
of their responsive actions leading to the sequence outcome
12See Footnote 7.
is a subjective measure of their collective trust, honour or
reliability — a fuller account of these estimates is given in
[10].
We first consider a special case of the expected rating of
a diminutive action sequence consisting of a single agent,
Ω = {β}, and a single action — as is observed in the
case of “commitment followed by subsequent enactment”. In
this case if we use the method of Section IV-A to estimate
Ptβ(v|u) where u is the commitment and v the enactment
then:
Tα(β, u, e) =
∑
v
ρ(α, v, e)× Ptβ(v|u)
Then α’s estimate of the trust, honour or reliability of β
with respect to a class of utterances U will be:
Tα(β, U, e) =
∑
u∈U
Tα(β, u, e)× Ptα(u)
where Ptα(u) is as above.
For action sequences in general we abbreviate the expecta-
tion of Equation 7 to Pt(r|s, e) that we may estimate directly
using the same reasoning for estimating Ptβ(v|u) in Sec-
tion IV-A as r is over a discrete space. Then Tα(Ω, s, e) =
EtΩ(r|s, e) and Tα(Ω, S, e) =
∑
s∈S Tα(Ω, s, e)× Ptα(s).
V. ECOLOGICAL DELIBERATION
Human agents employ ecological deliberation for all but
a very small proportion of the decisions that they make.
The neurological processes that enable human non-Cartesian
deliberative processes are not well understood. It appears
that given a need, contextual triggers somehow retrieve
appropriate action sequences from experiential memory. The
retrieval process does not require a complete match and
operates tentatively when the perceived environment is new,
possibly by adapting the action sequence. This is reminiscent
of the work of Roger Schank on dynamic memory.
When an agent is ‘born’ it will have no experiential
memory, and its only rational basis for deliberative action
will be either through pre-programmed constructivist delib-
eration or by imitating a ‘parent’ or ‘teacher’. Thereafter,
whenever it acts it will observe the effects of its actions and
its experiential memory will expand.
α has the following assets at its disposal to support
ecological deliberation:
• an experiential memory — Section III
• expectations — Section IV
• a world model — Section III-A
• a social model — Section III-B
Together experiential memory and expectations make a
potent pair. Experiential memory contains details of action
sequences, and expectations tell us what to expect if those
sequences are reused. The world and social models describe
the states of affairs that α desires to change.
An agent acts to satisfy its needs. An ecological agent’s
rationality lies in the trust that it has of others. This means
that an ecological agent’s desires should address its social
needs as well as its material needs — these may not be com-
patible. And this means that the actions that an ecological
agent takes should attempt to shape its social model as well
as its world model13. An agent’s social structures, and the
structures of the institutions that it inhabits, are its means to
transcend its individual ability.
An agent will make an ecologically rational deliberative
action by:
• reusing an existing action sequence14,
• improving an existing action sequence by referring to
prior action experiences,
• adapting an existing action sequence when its norms or
initial state are dissimilar to those prevailing,
• simplifying an existing action sequence by delegating
responsibility for part of it to another (trusted) agent,
• experimenting — possibly by attempting to second-
guess the rationale behind other agents’ actions
Rather than give a tedious description of how each of the
above operations may be performed we simply assume that
they all have been, and that we are confronted with an enor-
mous selection of previous, improved, adapted, simplified
and created action sequences.
Our problem then is: given a current need, the current
norm state, and the current states of the world and social
models, to select one sequence. We deal with the complexity
of matching the current goal and environment to those of
previously observed sequences with a ‘super-Sim’ function
that moderates the expected rating (Section IV-B) of each
previously recorded sequence, s, to give expectations of the
rating, r(s) ∈ [0, 1], of how that sequence would perform if
it was reused now for the current need.
Given that we now face the problem of devising a method
that selects an action sequence it is worth considering first
what we expect of that method. What it should not do is to
say “That one is the best choice” that is pure constructivism
— it says “Carles and John have greater knowledge than
can ever emerge from the environment”. Worse still it would
mean that by determining the agent’s actions it would then
pervert the agent’s experiential memory for ever more15.
What is needed is an evolutionary method of some sort
— that may well be how humans operate. A problem with
evolutionary methods is that we may not be prepared to
accept poor performance while the method evolves, although
permitting a method to explore and make mistakes may also
enable it to discover.
The point of this digression is to excuse ourselves for
13In future work we propose to address how it should also attempt to
shape the norms of the institutions that it inhabits.
14In case this appears to be a simple application of case-based-reasoning-
style case retrieval, note the complexity of the all important environment.
The devil is in the environment.
15Unfortunately this complication also applies to the definition of ‘super-
Sim’.
presenting only a ‘quasi-ecological’ method that permits the
agent to explore whilst guiding it in an apparently sensible
direction. A strategy is reported in [20] on how to place all
of one’s wealth as win-bets indefinitely on successive horse
races so as to maximise the rate of growth; this is achieved
by proportional gambling, i.e. by betting a proportion of
one’s wealth on each horse equal to the probability that that
horse will win. This result is interesting as the strategy is
independent of the betting odds. The situation that we have is
not equivalent to the horse race, but it is tempting to consider





where c > 0 is a real constant that moderates the degree
of exploration. This strategy will favour those sequences
whose expected performance as estimated in Section IV-B
and moderated by ‘super-Sim’ is greater.
A. Overall Strategy
Finally we consider how an agent combines constructivist
and ecological deliberation.
Ecological deliberation is by no means the poor relation of
its Cartesian brother. Referring back to the ‘wine merchant’
example in Section I, it may simply be that the recommen-
dations of the wine merchant are better in all respects than
those that the agent could derive from the data available. If
this is so then a rational agent should surely prefer ecological
deliberation.
A committed constructivist might respond by saying that
clearly the agent should learn as much about wine as the
merchant and then everything becomes Cartesian again.
Building an agent into a “Mr Know-It-All” is dangerous if
it means that the agent believes his knowledge will remain
superior in a competitive world to that of other agents, he
may then live and decay in a state of sublime ignorance.
A rational agent builds an experiential memory and main-
tains an open mind on whether to choose constructivist or
ecological deliberation. It reinforces the choices it makes
by forming a view on which performs better by using its
subjective ability to evaluate outcomes.
VI. DISCUSSION
The full realisation of the Hayekian vision of self-evolving
agents situated in a world of self-evolving institutions is
an extensive research agenda that is the subject of on-
going research. For example, there is no clear means of
achieving an orderly self-evolution of normative systems in
a multi-system context. The contribution of this paper is
to describe how a single agent can engage in ecological
deliberation in addition to well-understood constructivist
deliberation. This enables agents to evolve and adapt their
deliberative processes as their environment and their fellow
agents evolve.
The social model contains beliefs of the strength of
agents’ relationships, enables agents to form desires of how
those relationships could be, and to form intentions of how
to make them so. A possible next step is to experiment with
a norm model in a similar fashion. If this can be achieved
through ecological deliberation then we will be close to
understanding self-evolving electronic institutions that will
take multiagent systems technology to a new level.
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